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1 Introduction
In a recent report (IEA (2006)), the International Energy Agency emphasises
altogether the historically high increase in oil prices and in CO2 concentra-
tion. Both of them increased of more than 20 percent during the last decade.
The report concludes in favour of policies aiming at promoting energy savings
along with the use of low-carbon technology. Those policies should rely on
the R&D budgets, in order to achieve technological progress in areas like hy-
drogen and fuel cells, advanced renewable energies, next-generation biofuels
and energy storage.
The interaction between Climate policy and endogenous technological
change has been recently studied in several papers (see Golombek and Hoel
(2005) and Golombek and Hoel (2006) for overviews). However, none of them
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focused on the interaction between the oil price, technological progress and
Greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper adds to this literature by studying an international nego-
tiation process about global warming which involves three state variables:
the pollution, the marginal extraction cost of the resource and the level of
knowledge in the renewable non polluting resource sector. Our approach uses
differential game models closed to van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994) who
compare centralized and decentralized solutions in a global pollution problem
with investment in clean technology1. In our paper, as in van der Ploeg and
de Zeeuw (1994), we compare the equilibrium outcome under international
coordination of environmental policies with equilibrium outcome that arises
when players adopt “open-loop” strategies in a N-symmetric players game 2.
In computing the decentralized equilibrium, we rely on the simplifying as-
sumption that taxation is an appropriate instrument of environmental policy,
as opposed to other instruments such as standards or marketable permits.
This assumption allows us to abstract from complex issues of what determine
the choice of policy instruments. Finally, a last feature of our model is that
we consider two asymmetrical players, as in List and Mason (2001), which
can be thought of as two groups of nations: the rich ones and the poor ones.
We indeed think that the asymmetry assumption is more realistic than the
symmetry one as far as climate change problems are concerned.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop
the general structure of the model. In Section 3, we derive the cooperative
and non-cooperative equilibria. In Section 4, we implement a Monte Carlo
procedure enabling to numerically solve the model. Results are presented in
Section 5 while Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a world with 2 players; indexed by i = 1, 2; corresponding to
two asymmetric countries which differ both in terms of their wealth and of
their sensitiveness to the environment. Both countries use oil, i.e. a non
renewable polluting energy, to produce an homogeneous consumption good.
1This former paper did not link those issues to the problem of oil depletion as it is done
here.
2In the differential games literature, it is well known that “open-loop” give smaller
payoffs than“closed-loop” strategies. The principal reason is that “closed-loop” strategies,
like linear Markov perfect strategies, ensure subgame perfection contrary to open-loop
strategies (Cf., e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1992), p.74-77).
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2.1 Scarcity and pollution
Oil extraction has two harmful effects.
First, it lowers the oil stock for the future. In this paper, we don’t model
oil as a finite-size non-renewable stock. We rather assume that the oil stock
is infinite, but that the marginal extraction cost is an increasing function of
the cumulated extractions. Moreover, the marginal extraction cost does not
depend on the instantaneous rate of extraction (in other words, the extraction
cost is a linear function of the rate of extraction). It follows that the resource
price, P, equates its marginal cost expressed in term of the aggregate output3.
We have:
P˙ =
2∑
i=1
ζEi (1)
Where Ei is the rate of resource extraction by country i, and ζ is a parameter.
ζ denotes the importance of scarcity. Indeed, for ζ = 0, the resource is
infinitely available at a constant marginal cost. On the other hand, for
ζ →∞, the marginal cost of extraction increases so fast that the extraction
is not profitable anymore.
The second harmful effect of oil extraction is pollution. In this paper, we
model oil pollution as a cumulative process. The stock of pollution follows:
M˙ =
2∑
i=1
Ei − δM (2)
where δ is a constant rate of decay of pollution.
Under this specification, pollution generates an external cost given by
αiM
2, where αi > 0 measures the degree of sensitivity to pollution of country
i.
2.2 The resource sector
The resource is used as an input to produce an aggregate good Qi, together
with a renewable non polluting energy. Ceteris Paribus, an improvement of
the knowledge about the backstop technology makes profitable a shift from
hydrocarbon to clean energy in a number of economic activities. Thus, for a
given Ei, this improvement generates an increase in the opportunity cost of
Ei. This effect is represented in figure 1
4.
3For simplicity stake, we also assume no rent due to imperfect competition on the oil
market.
4Technological changes are presented, for illustrative purpose, at a point of time to be
able to represented the effects in a two-dimensional figure. In a dynamic framework, the
effects of changes are, in fact, integrated over time.
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Figure 1: substitution between oil and clean energy
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Let A be a renewable non polluting resource and X a coefficient denoting
the level of knowledge in the renewable energy sector. For a given X, the
optimal level of production is Q, and the optimal combination of oil and
clean energy is given by (E,A). Now, what happens if X increases, inducing
a fall in the cost of the clean energy? First, the relative price of clean energy
to oil falls. Would this change in the price ratio have not affected the quan-
tity of output produced, the new optimal combination of input would have
been (E ′, A′), with more clean energy and less oil compared to the previous
equilibrium. But as the fall in the clean energy price also induces a fall in the
aggregate energy price, this creates incentives to produce a greater level of
final output. Let the new optimal output level be given by Q′. In this situa-
tion, the new optimal combination of input is (E ′′, A′′), with both more clean
energy and more oil compared to (E ′, A′). Actually, whether E ′′ is greater or
smaller than E is not an unambiguous issue. It depends both on the elastic-
ity of the production with respect to the energy price and on the elasticity
of substitution between oil and clean energy. Here, however, we assume that
different energy sources are strong enough substitutes to ensure that a fall
in the clean energy price always result in a fall in the oil consumption 5.
Within this setting, the two consequences of an increase in X are, first,
an increase in the production, and second, a fall in the use of oil. The net
production function of country i can then be written as6:
Qi = (βi,1 −X)Ei − β2E2i + ηi,1X − η2X2
where (βi,1, β2, ηi,1, η2) > 0 are parameters
7.
Figure 2 displays the production function net of the oil cost.
The lower curve represents the net production as a function of the oil use
before any increase in the knowledge stock. As soon as X increases, the net
production switches to the second upper curve. As expected, the new level
of production is higher while the new level of oil is lower.
2.3 The research sector
Economic activities in the research sector results in an increase in X. As X is
a pure public good, the motives to invest in research are twofold: first, R&D
5Joules that come from oil are perfect substitute of joules that come from any other
energy source. Only storage and transportation differ from one source to another.
6An alternative way to model those effects could consist in introducing the clean energy
A as a control variable into the model. Our current formulation is simpler but it has the
drawback that Inada conditions may not hold. For Monte Carlo procedure of section 4,
parameters are chosen such that the non negativity condition over Ei is warranted for any
relevant future.
7The interpretation of this parameters is explain below, see 2.4.
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Figure 2: Impact of a technology improvement in the renewable energy sector
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investment enables to lower the economic impact of the increasing scarcity of
the nonrenewable resource; second, R&D investment lowers the abatement
cost of an environmental policy that aims at substituting non-polluting to
polluting ones. As far as country i invests Ii in research, X follows:
X˙ = σ (I1 + I2)− X (3)
where σ and  are positive parameters.
This knowledge production function displays two main features. First,
with no investment in research, X decreases by X per unit of time. This
feature accounts for the necessity to maintain some minimum level of research
activity to transmit the knowledge from old generations to new generations.
Second, the productivity in research is constant. In consequence, the growth
of the knowledge stock will not be sustainable in the long-run8.
Finally, it is assumed that each country faces an investment cost given
by γI2i , where γ is a constant parameter.
2.4 Welfare functions
The welfare function of country i is given by:
Wi =
∞∫
0
e−ρt
[
(βi,1 − P −X)Ei − β2E2i + ηi,1X − η2X2 − αiM2 − γI2i
]
dt
where ρ is the discount rate.
Both countries differ from one each other with respect to their sensitiveness
to the environment and to their wealth. The higher αi, the higher the sen-
sitiveness to the environment of country i. The higher are βi,1 and ηi,1, the
richer is country i. Indeed, the wealth of a country comes from its capital
8This assumption differs from the one usually made in the endogenous growth liter-
ature, such as in Romer (1990), where the research productivity is linear with respect
to the knowledge stock. However, it should be noted that modelling the evolution of an
aggregate stock of knowledge is not the same as modelling the evolution of a sectoral stock
of knowledge. As pointed out by Aghion and Howitt (1998), the number of new ideas that
remain undiscovered in one particular sector should not be thought of as an infinite stock.
The linear modelling in macroeconomic models accounts both for the knowledge increase
in each sector (quality innovations) and for the increase of the number of sectors (variety
innovations). Within a given sector, the best way to model the innovation would probably
be a logistic function. It would account for the giants’ shoulders effect when the stock of
knowledge is low, and then for the rarefaction of the remaining undiscovered ideas when
the stock of knowledge is high. To keep in touch with the linear quadratic formulation,
the simplest specification is the constant productivity assumption made in equation 3
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accumulation. The capital accumulation makes the energy (both clean and
polluting energy) more productive.
Countries are supposed to be asymmetric. Let Country 1 be the rich one.
We pose:
β1,1 > β2,1
and
η1,1 > η2,1
Should we also assume that country 1 is the more sensitive to the en-
vironment? Following the Environmental Kuznets Curve which involves an
inverted U relationship between environmental pressure and per capita in-
come, such an assumption would appear reasonable.
However, as pointed out by the recent IPCC report (IPCC (2007)), global
warming is going to harm more severely developing countries than rich ones.
Consequently, it is not obvious whether α1 should be superior or inferior to
α2.
We then choose to investigate the two polar cases: In the first one, the
rich country is supposed to be more sensitive to the environmental damage
than the poor country (α1 > α2); In the second case, the opposite holds
(α1 < α2). The simulations in section (see 5) are run under both those
alternative specifications.
3 Cooperative and non-cooperative equilib-
ria
3.1 Cooperative equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the optimal path which allows to maximize
the sum W of both national objectives.
W ≡ W1 +W2
subject to 1, 2 and 3. This path characterizes the shape of an international
agreement between both countries.
The cooperative problem can be restated as the minimization of
W =
∞∫
0
(y′Qcy + v′Rcv) dt
8
subject to
y˙ = Ay +Bcv
with
y(t) ≡ e− 12ρt

P
M
X
1
 ; v(t) ≡ e− 12ρt

X
2
√
β2
− β1,1
2
√
β2
+ P
2
√
β2
+
√
β2E1
X
2
√
β2
− β2,1
2
√
β2
+ P
2
√
β2
+
√
β2E2
I1
I2

A ≡

−ρ
2
− ζ
β2
0 − ζ
β2
β1,1 ζ+β2,1 ζ
2β2
− 1
β2
−ρ
2
− δ − 1
β2
β1,1+β2,1
2β2
0 0 −ρ
2
−  0
0 0 0 −ρ
2

Bc ≡

ζ√
β2
ζ√
β2
0 0
1√
β2
1√
β2
0 0
0 0 σ σ
0 0 0 0
 ; Rc ≡

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 γ 0
0 0 0 γ

Qc ≡

− 1
2β2
0 − 1
2β2
β1,1
4β2
+ β2,1
4β2
0 α1 + α2 0 0
− 1
2β2
0 − 1
2β2
+ 2η2
β1,1+β2,1
4β2
− 1
η2
β1,1
4β2
+ β2,1
4β2
0 β1,1+β2,1
4β2
− 1
η2
−β21,1
4β2
− β22,1
4β2

Sc ≡ BcRc−1Bc′
The optimal linear strategy is given by
vc = Ccy
where Cc = −Rc−1Bc′Kc and Kc is the symmetric stabilizing solution of the
following algebraic Riccati equation:
A′Kc +KcA−KcScKc +Qc = 0
9
One of the purposes of this paper is to analyze the equilibrium strategies
of the players. However, Cc cannot be analyzed by itself because of the
matrix transformations required to solve the model. We have to define the
following two transformation matrices:
TR1 =

0.5√
β2
0 0.5√
β2
−0.5β1,1√
β2
0.5√
β2,2
0 0.5√
β2,2
−0.5β2,1√
β2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ;TR2 =

0.5√
β2
0 0 0
0 0.5√
β2
0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

which enable us to compute the following matrix Zc:
Zc = TR2 (C
c − TR1) =

zc1,1 · · · · · · zc1,4
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
zc4,1 · · · · · · zc4,4

The optimal strategies for each of our two players are then given by:
Ec1
Ec2
Ic1
Ic2
 = Zc

P
M
X
1

3.2 Closed-loop differential game
In this section, we look for a Nash closed-loop equilibrium. We want to char-
acterize the behaviour of both countries when they act without cooperating9.
Each country seeks to minimize:
∞∫
0
(y′Qiy + v′iRvi)dt
subject to:
y˙ = Ay +Bmi vi +B
m
j vj j 6= i
with
vi(t) ≡ e− 12ρt
(
X
2
√
β2
− βi,1
2
√
β2
+ P
2
√
β2
+
√
β2Ei
Ii
)
9The only cooperation assumed here is about the choice of stabilizing strategies.
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Bmi ≡

ζ√
βi,2
0
1√
βi,2
0
0 σ
0 0
 ; R
m ≡
(
1 0
0 γ
)
; Smi ≡ Bmi Rm−1Bm
′
i
Qmi ≡

− 1
4βi,2
0 − 1
4βi,2
βi,1
4βi,2
0 αi 0 0
− 1
4βi,2
0 − 1
4βi,2
+ ηi,2
βi,1
4βi,2
− 1
2ηi,2
βi,1
4βi,2
0
βi,1
4βi,2
− 1
2ηi,2
− β2i,1
4βi,2

In this setting, as shown in Engwerda (2005), the markovian linear strat-
egy, for player i, is given by:
vmi = C
m
i y
where Cmi = −Rm−1Bm′i Kmi =
(
cmi (1, 1) · · · · · · cmi (1, 4)
cmi (2, 1) · · · · · · cmi (2, 4)
)
and Kmi ,
i = 1, 2 are the symmetric stabilizing solutions of the following system of
algebraic Riccati equations10:
(A− Sm2 Km2 )′Km1 +Km1 (A− Sm2 Km2 )−Km1 Sm1 Km1 +Qm1 +Km2 Sm2 Km2 = 0
(A− Sm1 Km1 )′Km2 +Km2 (A− Sm1 Km1 )−Km2 Sm2 Km2 +Qm2 +Km1 Sm1 Km1 = 0
(4)
Let’s define Cm and vm as:
Cm =

cm1 (1, 1) · · · · · · cm1 (1, 4)
cm2 (1, 1) · · · · · · cm2 (1, 4)
cm1 (2, 1) · · · · · · cm1 (2, 4)
cm2 (2, 1) · · · · · · cm2 (2, 4)
 ; vm = Cmy
Like in the previous section, a transformation has to be done in order to
interpret the results. Zm is defined as:
Zm = TR2 (C
m − TR1) =

zm1,1 · · · · · · zm1,4
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
zm4,1 · · · · · · zm4,4

10The algorithm used to solve for this system is described in ANNEX 1.
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such that the markovian strategies are given by:
Em1
Em2
Im1
Im2
 = Zm

P
M
X
1

4 Monte Carlo procedure
4.1 First-best simulation strategy
A complete solution of the model would express each endogenous variable
of the model as a function of the set of parameters. Unfortunately, such
a solution is very hard, if possible, to compute. Let fi(pi) be the function
that gives the endogenous variable φi and pi the set of the N exogenous
parameters indexed by k. A Monte Carlo procedure enables to give a Taylor
approximation of fi for a range of parameters values. Indeed, for a given
pi, simple algorithms compute the particular solution of the model. We run
1000 simulations, choosing randomly pij for each iteration j. Let’s call φ¯i the
average value of φi in the sample. Then, we compute the OLS estimators ψˆ
of the set of parameters ψ of the following function:
φi = ψ1,i +
N∑
k=1
ψ(k+1,i)pik +
N∑
k=1
∑
k′≥k
ψ(k,k′,i)pikpik′ + ei (5)
where e is an error term11.
For each iteration, the parameters are chosen via an homogeneously dis-
tributed density function defined between 0.5µpii and 1.5µpii where µpii is the
mean value of pii.
Unfortunately, until now, every attempt to perform those numerical com-
putations have failed. The reason is that the computer takes the matrix to
be inverted in the ols method12 to be singular. We then decide to adapt our
simulation strategy towards a less demanding objective.
4.2 Second-best simulation strategy
In our second-best simulation strategy, we remove all the squares and the
2*2 interactions in the equation 5. This leaves us only with the coefficients
11Notice that the error term is treated as random, even if it’s not: it is the difference
between the genuine deterministic function and its Taylor approximation.
12Namely, (ν′ν), where ν is the matrix of exogenous variables.
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of the 14 parameters, plus a constant. The endogenous variables are the 16
components of both the matrix Zc and Zm, the state of the stocks after 10
periods (which represents a relevant future), the state of the stocks after 600
periods (which represents the steady state of the model), and the intertem-
poral welfare computed over the 10 first periods, both for the cooperative
equilibrium and the markovian equilibrium.
5 Results
5.1 General Results
As noted previously, we discriminate between two different study-cases de-
pending on the relative countries’ sensitiveness to environmental damages.
In the first case (referred to as Case 1), the poor country is supposed to
display the greatest sensitiveness to environmental damages (α1 < α2). In
the second case (referred to as Case 2), the rich country is the one which
displays the greatest sensitiveness to environmental damages (α1 > α2).
The results are presented from Table 1 to 613. The first two tables (Table
1 and table 2) display the Cooperative equilibrium, respectively, for Case 1
and Case 2. The next two tables (Table 3 and table 4) present the equilibrium
issues of the Markovian game, respectively for Case 1 and Case 2. Figures
in bracket represent the percentage of iterations where the absolute value
for the corresponding component in the Markovian strategy is greater than
the absolute value for the same component in the Cooperative equilibrium.
Finally, the last two tables (Table 5 and table 6) display , respectively for
Case 1 and Case 2, the welfare for each country (designed by Wi(10), i = 1, 2)
and the aggregated welfare after 10 years, in cooperative and markovian
equilibrium, and the value of the three stocks after 10 and 600 years.
Three noticeable features of the model emerge from tables 1 to 6. First,
any increase in the oil price, the pollution stock and the stock of knowledge
induce lower emissions. This result holds for 100% of the simulations. It
simply reflects the fact that the three stocks increase the cost of using oil: the
direct private cost (price), the external cost (pollution) and the opportunity
cost (knowledge). This effect is however reinforced when the richest country is
the more sensitive to environmental damage (This can be seen by comparing
the marginal impacts from the three stocks across Case 1 and Case 2).
Second, in the cooperative equilibrium, the same level of R&D investment
is required in the poor and in the rich countries: from that point of view,
the solution is egalitarian rather than equitable. However, this result comes
13See tables in annex A.
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from the assumption that both countries have the same cost of investment
in research activity (γ is identical for the two countries), and would not hold
otherwise. Third, in the cooperative equilibrium, both in Case 1 and in Case
2, the most important emissions come from the more technologically efficient
country, i.e. Country 1.
Let us now turn to two important results. The first one concerns the rel-
ative welfare gains between the cooperative and the noncopperative outcome
while the second one concerns the relative levels of R&D spending between
both those alternative outcomes.
Considering first welfare issues, an interesting result emerges from the
comparison of welfare gains after 10 years. As expected, the aggregated wel-
fare is always greater in the cooperative outcome compared to the Markovian
one. However, from a national point of view, the cooperative equilibrium is
preferred to the Markovian one by the two nations only in Case 2, namely
when the richest country is also the most sensitive to environmental damage.
In this case, indeed, the adoption of free riding strategies always leads to a
decrease in both welfares. On the contrary, in Case 1, only the poor country
which is also the most sensitive to environmental damage) has an advantage
to cooperate. The welfare of Country 1 increases in the Markovian outcome
compared to the Cooperative one. This result can explain why some industri-
alized countries are reluctant to ratify international agreements on Climate
Change such as the Kyoto Protocol.
A closer examination of the impacts of the three stocks on oil consumption
helps to explain why the adoption of free riding strategies in the Markovian
game is likely. First, note that, in both Case 1 and Case 2, the variations
are small (in absolute values) for the country that is the most sensitive to
environmental damage and large for the other country14.
Second, the negative impact of pollution on the emissions is stronger
in the cooperative game compared to the Markovian game. Indeed, in the
cooperative game, each player takes into account the negative impact of
pollution not only on its own situation, but also on the situation of the other
player. It can be added that the difference is rather important for the country
that is less sensitive to the environmental damages. This reflects the idea
that the adoption of free riding strategies in the Markovian game primarily
comes from the behaviour of the less sensitive country15. Third, a similar
14Indeed, the cooperative equilibrium is closer to the individual preferences of the most
sensitive country.
15Indeed, z¯
c
1,2
z¯m1,2
= 9, 86 in Case 1 and z¯
c
2,2
z¯m2,2
= 10, 03 in Case 2. zci,2 > z
m
1,2 is true in
100% of the simulations, for i=1 in Case 1 and i=2 in Case 2. Morever, the difference
is unimportant for the country which is the most sensitive to the environmental damage
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argument holds developed concerning the impact of the knowledge stock over
the emissions. This impact is weaker for the less environmental sensitive
country (in 98% of the simulations in Case 1 and in 98,4% of the simulations
in Case 2) and is stronger for the most environmental sensitive country (in
100% of the simulations for the two cases). Moreover, the amplitude of
the variations is lower for the most sensitive country compared to the less
sensitive one. Finally, the impact of oil price on oil consumption is stronger in
the Markovian game than in the Cooperative game for the two countries, with
the most important variation for the less sensitive environmental countries.
To understand the deep reason behind this over-reaction to the oil price on
oil consumption, one need however to acknoweldge the second main result of
our research.
Our second striking result is that the aggregate level of R&D expenditures
is lower under the cooperative outcome compared to the non-cooperative
one. In other words, an agreement based on both R&D and emission cutting
reduces the aggregate cumulative R&D expenditure. We call this effect the
“paradox of knowledge”. On the one hand, the public good nature of the
knowledge implies that, ceteris paribus, the aggregate R&D expenditure is
higher in the cooperative case than in the non cooperative case. But, on the
other hand, in the cooperative case, both the stock of pollution and the oil
prices are small compared to the non cooperative case (Cf. table 5 and table
6). The private incentives to invest in research are then higher in the non-
cooperative equilibrium as knowledge improvements are what allow to offset
higher oil prices and higher levels of pollution. Of course, the cooperative
outcome remains a better outcome even if it implies less research. Finally,
this ”knowledge paradox” also help to explain why oil consumption over-
reacts to oil price under the Markovian game. Indeed, the players know that
a Markovian game lead to an over-investment in knowledge, which allows to
substitutes more production by the output of research sector to the emissions
in presence of an increase in the oil price.
This result has also strong normative implications. It indeed offers a
counter-argument to the view that increasing the amounts of R&D spend-
ing on low-carbon technology should be considered as a key criteria in any
future agreement. From this perspective, our result generalizes a previous
implication by the model by van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994), according to
which, in the absence of international coordination for pollution control, lev-
els of clean technology stocks are too excessive. This implication also holds
in our setting. Let us examine the impacts of the three stocks on the level
( z¯
c
i,2
z¯mi,2
= 1, 03 for i=2 in Case 1 and i=1 in Case 2 and zci,2 > z
m
1,2 is true for only 74,6% of
the simulations for i=2 in Case 1 and for 71,5% of the simulations for i=1 in Case 2).
15
of R&D investment. First, in Case 1 and Case 2, the investments by both
countries are less sensitive to the stock of knowledge. Second, in both cases,
the less environmentally sensitive country knows that the other player has
to invest more in case of an increase of the pollution stock. In consequence,
the less sensitive country can invest less in reaction to this increase (in fact,
the impact of the stock pollution becomes negative for the less environmen-
tal sensitive country in the Markovian game). On the other hand, the most
environmentally sensitive country knows that the other country has, in a
Markovian game, a lower reaction in the presence of an increase of the stock
pollution in term of investment, compared to the optimum, so this country
must increase his own reaction in order to compensate the behavior from the
other country (as it can be seen, in the two cases, the impact of the pollution
stock on investment is, in absolute value, larger in the Markovian game com-
pared to the Cooperative equilibrium, for the most environmental sensitive
country). An opposite argument, in terms of countries, explain the fact that
the sign of the impact of the oil price on investment becomes negative for the
most environmental sensitive country and increases in absolute value (for a
majority of simulations) for the less environmental sensitive country.
In order to go deeper in the analysis, we now proceed to some static
comparative exercises. We investigate the impact of changing the value of
key parameters on the coefficients of the regressions explained in section 4.
The large number of coefficients does not however allow us to study each of
them in a systematic way. We rather select the most salient effects.
5.2 On Chinese growth
The non-inclusion of emerging countries such as China is an important critic
addressed to the Kyoto protocol by the United States. In this subsection, we
study the impact of an increase in the wealth of the poor country (through an
increase of β2,1 and η2,1) on the relevant variables. The results are presented
in tables 7 to 18. For all the tables hereafter, number in bracket represents
the Student’s t statistics associated to the corresponding variation.16
Tables 10 and 11 show that when the growth of the poor country occurs
by the mean of an increase in its emissions’ productivity (through parameter
β2,1), it always induces a significant welfare loss for the rich country. This
welfare loss is larger when the rich country is also the most sensitive to
environmental damage (Case 2). On the other hand, the welfare of the poor
country does not necessarily increase. Tables 7 and 8 clearly show than an
16In order to have a P-value never greater than 15% we only comment absolute
values above 1,5.
16
increase in β2,1 leads to an increase of the welfare of Country 2 only when
this country is the less sensitive to environmental damage(Case 2). In the
opposite case, i.e when the poor country is very sensitive to environmental
damage (Case 1), an increase in its wealth through β2,1 paradoxically lowers
the welfare of both economies.
At the aggregated level, it is also noticeable that the increase in the wealth
of the poor economy through β2,1, does not necessarily lead to a significant
increase in aggregated emissions, and consequently, to a significant increase
in the global pollution stock. Global emissions increase only after 10 years in
the Markovian game of Case 1 and after 10 and 600 years for the Markovian
game of Case 2. This result can be explained as follows. On the one hand,
an increase of β2,1 lowers the impact of some of the three stocks on emissions
(especially the impact of the knowledge stock on emissions for Case 1 and
the impact of the pollution stock on emissions of country 2 in Case 2 in the
Markovian equilibrium) and increases the emissions’ constant of the Country
2. But at the same time, it reduces the emissions’ constant of Country 1 and
this can lead to a reduction of the Country 1 emissions. The likelihood of a
decrease in aggregated emissions is reinforced by the decrease of oil price, in
both Case 1 and 2, in the Cooperative equilibrium. This reflects the fact the
the pressure on the oil market is lower under the Cooperative equilibrium.
In terms of R&D investment, as shown by tables 9 and 10, an increase in β2,1
has only little impact.
In sum, the rich country always suffer from an increase in the wealth
of the poor economy driven by improvements in its emissions’ productivity.
Moreover, the rich country loses more in the Cooperative equilibrium when
the poor country is also the more sensitive to environmental damage (Case
1) and in the Markovian game when the rich country is the most sensitive to
environmental damage (Case 2).
If we turn now to the case where the increase in the wealth of the poor
country is driven by parameter η2,1 things change substantially. Specifically,
the rich country is less likely to suffer from the wealth improvement of the
poor economy while welfare gains are warranted for the poor country. This
result can be explained as follows. First, as shown by tables 17 and 18, an
increase of η2,1 leads to an increase of the knowledge stock
17. It also leads
to a reduction, in the cooperative equilibrium, of the impact of the pollution
stock on emissions when the poor country is the most environmental sensitive
and to an increase of the impact of the oil price on the emissions when the
17This result is due to an increase in the investment constant for both countries in the
Cooperative equilibrium and to an increase of the investment constant for Country 2 that
overcompensates the decrease of the investment constant for Country 1 in the Markovian
game.
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poor country is the least environmental sensitive. In terms of Welfare, the
poor country always gains while the rich country looses only in Case 1 for
the Markovian equilibrium.
5.3 On inequality growth
In the previous section, we have studied the impact of a reduction in the
wealth gap between the poor and the rich countries. In this section, we
investigate the opposite case, i.e. the case of a widening of the wealth gap
between the two groups of countries. One can think, for instance, to the
relative position of some African countries in comparison to the industrialized
world. To investigate this issue, we consider how an increase in the wealth
of the rich country (either driven by an increase of β1,1 or by an increase in
η1,1) affects the relevant variables. Our main results are presented in tables
19 to 30 below.
The impact of an increase of β1,1 is rather simple to understand. Whatever
the relative sensitiveness of the countries to the environment, an increase in
β1,1 leads to an increase in the emissions of Country 1 and to a decrease in
the emissions of Country 2 (through its impact on the emissions constants).
At an aggregate level, this leads to an increase of emissions as it can be seen
through the increase of the oil price and of the pollution stock after 10 and
600 years.
In terms of R&D investment, the impact of the oil price and of the pollu-
tion stock is lowered for both countries in the Cooperative equilibrium and
in the Markovian game as long as the rich country is the less sensitive to
environmental damage. Moreover, the increase of β1,1 does not significantly
impact the knowledge stock whatever the type of equilibrium and whatever
the relative sensitiveness of countries 1 and 2 to the environment.
Finally, tables 23 and 24 show the impacts in terms of welfare. An increase
in β1,1 always leads to welfare gains for the rich country and to welfare looses
for the poor country. This result is amplified when the poor country is the
most sensitive to environmental damage.
The impact of an increase of in η1,1 is studied in tables 25 to 30. Un-
expectedly, an increase in η1,1 does not have any significant impact on the
emissions, on the oil price and on the pollution stock. In other words, there
is no substitution between dirty and clean technologies when the rich country
increases its wealth by the way of an increase of its productivity in terms of
use of stock knowledge. Indeed, the effects are concentrated on the invest-
ment by the two countries and on the knowledge stock: in the Cooperative
equilibrium, the two countries increase their R&D investments (as it can be
seen by examining the investment constants). Moreover, in both Case 1 and
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Case 2, and in Markovian game, in compliance with free riding strategies,
Country 2 decreases its R&D investment. Indeed, Country 2 knows that
Country 1 has to increase its own investment, and Country 1 increases its
investment more strongly than in the Cooperative equilibrium, because it
knows that Country 2 has to decrease its own investment. Those effects lead
to an increase of the knowledge stock except for the first periods under Case
1.
In term of welfare, an increase in η1,1 is more equitable than an increase
in β1,1 because it improves the welfare of the rich country without harming
the poor country. Actually, the poor country experiment welfare gains in all
cases except one: in the Markovian equilibrium when the rich country is the
most sensitive to environmental damage.
5.4 The Impact of an increase in environmental con-
cerns
We have now to study the impacts of an increase of environmental concerns.
We distinguish the two possible cases: an increase in environmental concerns
for the rich country (increase of α1) and for the poor country (increase of
α2). The results are summarized in table 31 to 42.
As expected, in the Cooperative equilibrium, an increase of the concern
for environmental damages, whatever the country that is the more environ-
mental sensitive, always leads to an increase, in absolute value, in the impact
of the pollution stock on the emissions. In some situations, still for the Co-
operative equilibrium, this increase, which reflects an increase of the external
cost (pollution) is partly compensated by a significantly decrease in the im-
pact of the oil price on the emission (this can be checked in all situations
except for an increase of the richest country environmental concern when the
poorest country is the more environmentally sensitive), reflecting a decrease
in the opportunity direct private cost in regard to the external cost, and, for
an increase of the richest country environmental concern when he is already
the more environmental sensitive, by a reduction of the impact of the knowl-
edge stock on the emissions, reflecting a decrease of the opportunity cost of
knowledge in terms of external cost. An increase in the environmental con-
cern of one of the countries leads to a decrease in the constant of emissions
for both countries when this country is the more environmental sensitive.
It leads to a decrease in the constant of emissions of the poor Country in
both cases when this country is the less environmental sensitive. This can
be explain, for an increase of α1 in Case 1, by the fact that the technological
advantage of the Country 1 prate in the sense of the option to decrease the
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constant emissions of Country 2, because it is the more efficient, by com-
parison of the opportunity cost. In terms of investment in the knowledge
stock, in the Cooperative equilibrium, there is also always an increase of the
impact of the pollution stock on the investment in response to an increase
in the environmental concerns. As for the emission, this increase is par-
tially compensated by a significant decrease in the impact of the oil price on
the emissions, in all situations except for an increase of the richest country
environmental concern in case 1.
In the Markovian game, the results are complicated by the presence of
free riding strategies. In terms of emissions, an increase in the environmen-
tal concern for a country always results in an increase in the impact of the
pollution stock on his own emissions. When the country is the more envi-
ronmental sensitive, this increase is straightened in both cases by a decrease
in the impact of the oil price and of the knowledge stock on his own emis-
sions. The decrease of the oil price on the poor country emissions after an
increase of α2 is also present in Case 2. In response, the other country can
either lower the impact of the pollution stock on the emission (rich coun-
try strategies in front of an increase of α2) or the impact of the oil price in
the emission (poor country strategies when he is at before the increase of
α1 the more environmental sensitive) or lower the impact of the two stocks
(poor country strategies in front of an increase of α1 in Case 2). In terms of
emissions constant, it is lowered by the rich country after an increase of α1
only in case 2 and by the poor country after an increase of α2 in both cases.
After an increase of α2, when the rich country is before the increase the less
environmental sensitive, he is taking advantage to that increase for lowering
his own constant emission.
In terms of investments, in the Markovian game, when the environmental
concern of the richest country is increased but that the more environmental
sensitive country is the poorest one, the result his a relatively more virtuous
situation since there is for the two countries a decrease of the impact of oil
price on investment and an increase of the impact of the pollution stock on
investment. This is because, in this case, there is a partial reconciliation
between the concerns of both countries: the more technologically efficient
country, the richest one, and the more environmental sensitive, the poorest
one. Moreover, this mechanism is necessary as a partial counterpart of the
excessive presence of non-socially efficient strategies as it can be seen by
the examination of the evolution of stocks. Indeed, when the the pollution
stock is affected by the increase in the environmental concern of one country
(which is always the case after 10 years and two time after 600 years), the
change is always negative, except after 600 years for the case examined here.
In the three other cases there is a reinforcement of the free riding strategies:
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the negative or positive impacts of both the oil price and of the pollution
stock on investment are always increased. This is confirmed by the fact that
the investment constant of the country for which the environmental concern
increases when he is the more environmental sensitive increased (Cf. Table
34 and 39), whereas the investment constant for the other country decreases.
As may be expected, the welfare of both countries are always lowered
by an increase of the environmental concerns for one of this countries in the
Cooperative equilibrium except for the welfare of the poor country in Case
1 which is not significantly affected by an increase of α1. In the Markovian
game, the welfare of the country which experiences a raise in his environmen-
tal concern is always lowered and, by the means of the adoption of free riding
strategies, the welfare of the other country is always improved except in the
case of an increase of α2 in Case 1, the welfare of the rich country is not
significantly affected. To complete the analysis of an impact of an increase
of one country environmental concerns, it should be noted that the oil price,
is always decreased after 10 and 600 years.
5.5 The impact of an increase in the rate of pollution
decay
It is well-known since the seminal work by Forster 18, that an increase in the
rate of pollution decay does not affect unambiguously the pollution stock.
It rather has two opposite effects on the pollution stock. On the one side,
it reduces the pollution stock as it increases the free cleaning contribution
of the environment. On the other side, it increases the pollution stock as
the additional free cleaning contribution reduces the environmental concerns
bound to the presence of the pollution stock in environment, which leads to
greater production and additional waste. The pollution stock can therefore
be increased or decreased depending on the relative weight of the two effects.
The presence of these counterbalancing forces can be checked in Tables
43 to 48. In particular, we show that an increase in the rate of pollution
decay induces a direct increase of emissions in all situations. Indeed, when
the constants emissions are significantly affected, the sign is always positive.
Moreover, in all cases, the impact of the pollution stock on emissions de-
creases, and in some cases, the impact of oil price on emissions increases.
Consequently, the oil price increases in all cases after 10 and 600 years. Sim-
ilar mechanisms lead to a decrease in the knowledge stock when the latter
impact is significant.
Our main result remains however that the second effect is overwhelmed
18Cf. Forster (1975) and Forster (1977).
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by the first one for all situations. Consequently, an increase in the rate of
pollution decay in our model unambiguously improves the welfare of both
countries and reduces the pollution stock after 10 and 600 years.
5.6 The impacts of an increase in the discount rate
The use of discount rates in long-run environmental and natural resource
use problems is a controversial issue. The basic concern is that too high
discount rates can lead to intergenerational conflicts. In particular, they
may over-weight the welfare of the present generations to the detriment of
future generations (see e.g. Howarth (1996)). Moreover, in the context of
our current research, the discount rate tends to increase the opportunity cost
of the knowledge cost (which require actual investment for a future use) in
regard to the use of the “dirty” production technology. Those intuitions are
confirmed by the results in Tables 49 to 54. As shown by tables 49 and 50, an
increase in the discount rate leads to i) an increase in the emission constant
for both countries, ii) an increase in the impact of the variable reflecting the
direct private cost of the use of the “dirty technology” (oil price) on emissions,
iii) a decrease in the impact of the pollution stock on the level of emissions,
and iv) a decrease in the impact of the knowledge stock on emissions (only
in Case 2). In terms of R&D investment, an increase in the discount rate
leads to an increase in the impact of oil price on R&D investment in the
Cooperative equilibrium and to a decrease in this impact in the Markovian
game. It also leads to a decrease in the impact of the pollution stock on
R&D investment in both cases, to a decrease in the investment constants in
a majority of situations and to a decrease in the impact of the knowledge
stock on R&D investment.
As a result, there is an increase in the oil price after 10 and 600 years
for all the situations, an increase in the pollution stock after 10 years and
a decrease after 600 years for Case 2 (in Case 1 the pollution stock is not
significantly affected after 600 years) and a decrease in the stock of knowledge
after 10 years.
The discount rate seems also to be important in terms of intragenerational
transfers. Tables 53 and 54 show that an increase in the discount rate leads
to an increase in the welfare for both countries only in Case 2, i.e. when
the rich country is also the most sensitive to environmental damage. In the
alternative Case 1, the welfare of the rich country improves while the the
poor country experiments a worsening of its welfare. Those results hold both
for the Cooperative equilibrium and for the Markovian game.
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5.7 The impacts of an increase in the cost of invest-
ment
The impacts of an increase in the cost of investment are shown in tables 55
and 56 below. Paradoxically, an increase in the cost of investment has little
impact on the level of emissions. It however affects substantially the level
of R&D investment. Whatever the relative environmental concerns and the
type of game the nations are involved in, the impacts of each of the three
stocks on the level of R&D investment are all lowered by an increase in the
cost of investment19. The investment constants are also always lowered.
An even more surprising result is that the increase in the cost of invest-
ment has little impact in terms of the stock of knowledge and in terms of
welfare: the only effects which are significant are an increase in the welfare
of the poor country in Case 2 and a decrease in the stock of knowledge after
10 years in Case 1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of international coordination in Climate
policy using a three state-variables (oil price, pollution and knowledge), two
asymmetric countries (a rich one and a poor one) differential game with
Markov-linear strategies. Unfortunately, purely analytic solution of this kind
of games cannot be found. We use a Monte Carlo procedure to get an insight
into the behavior of the model. This allows us to make a study in terms
of emission and investment strategies, of state of the three stocks and of
countries’ welfare. We also proceeded to some static comparative exercises
for the more relevant parameters. We distinguished two cases regarding the
relative countries’ sensitiveness to environmental damages: in the first case,
the poor country whose supposed to be the more environmental sensitive,
while the opposite is assumed in the second case.
This study puts in light the “paradox of knowledge”: while knoledge
is a public good, the non-cooperative equilibrium displays a higher level of
R&D expenditures than the optimal path. This over-investment in R&D
is a reaction to the increase in the oil price that is faster along the non
cooperative equilibrium than along the optimal path. This paradox questions
the assertion that R&D spending on low-carbon technology should be a key
feature of any further agreement.
19The only exception is the impact of the oil price on the investment of the poor country
in Case 1 which is not significantly altered.
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Static comparative results also put into light several points regarding the
current debates about Climate Change, such as the question of the non-
inclusion of emerging countries like China to the Kyoto protocol. We find
that an increase of poor country’s wealth by the mean of an increase of his
emissions’ productivity always leads to a welfare loss for the rich country,
sometimes to a welfare loss for the poor country (when he is the most sen-
sitive to environmental damage) but does not necessary lead to a significant
increase in the global pollution stock. By comparison, if increase of poor
country’s wealth proceed from an increase of his use of clean technology abil-
ities, the rich country is less likely to suffer from the wealth improvement of
the poor economy, while welfare gains are warranted for the poor country.
To refine the analysis, we should go beside the linear regression used here,
in order to test the impact of interactions between couples of parameters, and
the squares of some of these parameters: this is part of our research agenda.
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A Tables
A.1 Mean values of the endogenous variables
 
 dP dM dX Cte 
1
cdE  -1,63E-03 -8,08E-03 -2,69E-03 9,37 
2
cdE  -1,63E-03 -8,08E-03 -2,69E-03 3,90 
1
cdI  5,99E-04 2,95E-03 -7,08E-01 72,5 
2
cdI  5,99E-04 2,95E-03 -7,08E-01 72,5 
 
Table 1: Equilibrium strategies: the Cooperative equilibrium in Case 1
 
 dP dM dX Cte 
1
cdE  -1,65E-03 -8,19E-03 -2,73E-03 9,51 
2
cdE  -1,65E-03 -8,19E-03 -2,73E-03 3,92 
1
cdI  6,10E-04 2,99E-03 -7,09E-01 72,8 
2
cdI  6,10E-04 2,99E-03 -7,09E-01 72,8 
 
Table 2: Equilibrium strategies: the Cooperative equilibrium in Case 1
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 dP dM dX Cte 
1
mdE  -2,39E-03 
(100%) 
-8,19E-04 
(0%) 
-2,75E-03 
(100%) 
12 
(100%) 
2
mdE  -1,88E-03 
(99%) 
-7,84E-03 
(25,4%) 
-2,67E-03 
(2%) 
5,28 
(99,7%) 
1
mdI  6,72E-04 
(60,5%) 
-2,26E-03 
(1,9%) 
-4,08E-01 
(0%) 
39,4 
(0%) 
2
mdI  -3,02E-05 
(2,7%) 
5,94E-03 
(100%) 
-4,08E-01 
(0%) 
44,2 
(0%) 
 
Table 3: Equilibrium strategies: the Markovian game in Case 1
 
 dP dM dX Cte 
1
mdE  -1,90E-03 
(98,8%) 
-7,98E-03 
(28,5%) 
-2,71E-03 
(1,6%) 
10,1 
(94,6%) 
2
mdE  -2,43E-03 
(100%) 
-8,16E-04 
(0%) 
-2,79E-03 
(100%) 
7,34 
(100%) 
1
mdI  -3,38E-05 
(2,9%) 
6,03E-03 
(100%) 
-4,08E-01 
(0%) 
42,5 
(0%) 
2
mdI  6,87E-04 
(61,5%) 
-2,30E-03 
(1,7%) 
-4,08E-01 
(0%) 
41,7 
(0%) 
 
Table 4: Equilibrium strategies: the Markovian game in Case 1
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  
1,2
(10)i
i
W
=
∑  
Cooperative equilibrium 1,76E+05 -4,86E+05 -3,10E+05 
Markovian equilibrium 3,56E+05 
(100%) 
-5,60E+05 
(96,4%) 
-2,04E+05 
(100%) 
 (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  
Cooperative equilibrium 448 709 116 
Markovian equilibrium 582 
(100%) 
773 
(100%) 
126 
(85,9%) 
 (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
Cooperative equilibrium 3400 212 111 
Markovian equilibrium 4360 
(96,8%) 
176 
(18,5%) 
120 
(93,5%) 
 
Table 5: Various value after 10 and 600 years: Case 1
26
 
 
1(10)W  2 (10)W  
1,2
(10)i
i
W
=
∑  
Cooperative equilibrium -3,71E+05 6,41E+04 -3,07E+05 
Markovian equilibrium -4,19E+05 
(92%) 
1,49E+05 
(99%) 
-2,70E+05 
(100%) 
 (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  
Cooperative equilibrium 448 709 116 
Markovian equilibrium 548 
(100%) 
756 
(100%) 
123 
(85,1%) 
 (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
Cooperative equilibrium 3400 213 111 
Markovian equilibrium 3620 
(87,6%) 
177 
(2,9%) 
119 
(88,1%) 
 
Table 6: Various value after 10 and 600 years: Case 2
A.2 Impact of the growth in the poor country
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
2,66E-08 
(1,32) 
1,09E-07 
(9,24E-01) 
6,86E-08 
(1,57) 
-8,39E-04 
(-6,86) 
2,66E-08 
(1,32) 
1,09E-07 
(9,24E-01) 
6,86E-08 
(1,57) 
2,19E-03 
(3,56) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
1,18E-05 
(1,72) 
3,71E-06 
(8,10E-01) 
1,47E-05 
(1,68) 
-5,89E-02 
(-2,19) 
8,33E-06 
(1,3) 
3,16E-05 
(8,49E-01) 
1,40E-05 
(1,55) 
-2,28E-02 
(21,6) 
Impact of 2,1β  on the emissions, Case 1 
Table 7:
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 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
-1,00E-08 
(-4,86E-01) 
3,95E-09 
(3,44E-02) 
3,36E-08 
(7,63E-01) 
-6,28E-04 
(-4,91) 
-1,00E-08 
(-4,86E-01) 
3,95E-09 
(3,44E-02) 
3,36E-08 
(7,63E-01) 
2,33E-03 
(35,9) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
3,02E-08 
(1,03) 
-7,63E-08 
(-5,78E-01) 
3,51E-08 
(8,07E-01) 
-3,99E-04 
(-2,65) 
4,56E-09 
(1,30E-01) 
3,08E-08 
(1,9) 
3,12E-08 
(6,80E-01) 
2,41E-03 
(21,5) 
Impact of 2,1β  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 8:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
7,75E-10 
(-1,12E-08) 
-1,89E-08 
(1,51E-08) 
5,66E-06 
(3,21E-06) 
6,29E-04 
(9,63E-04) 
7,75E-10 
(1,51E-08) 
-1,89E-08 
(-4,52E-08) 
5,66E-06 
(3,22E-06) 
6,29E-04 
(-2,04E-04) 
Markovian 
equilibrium -1,12E-08 
(7,09E-02) 
1,51E-08 
(-2,79E-
01) 
3,21E-06 
(1,01) 
9,63E-04 
(8,32E-01) 
1,51E-08 
(7,09E-02) 
-4,52E-08 
(-2,79E-01) 
3,22E-06 
(1,01) 
-2,04E-04 
(8,32) 
Impact of 2,1β  on the investments, Case 1 
Table 9:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
-1,08E-08 
(-8,84E-01) 
2,56E-08 
(4,02E-01) 
2,42E-06 
(4,34E-01) 
-7,81E-04 
(-1,04) 
-1,08E-08 
(-8,84E-01) 
2,56E-08 
(4,02E-01) 
2,42E-06 
(4,34E-01) 
-7,81E-04 
(-1,04) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
-3,64E-08 
(-1,94) 
1,51E-07 
(9,89E-01) 
1,41E-06 
(4,40E-01) 
4,19E-04 
(8,69E-01) 
1,60E-08 
(8,63E-01) 
-8,86E-08 
(-1,29) 
1,42E-06 
(4,41E-01) 
-1,28E-03 
(-2,66) 
Impact of 2,1β  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 10:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
-23,9 
(-4,97) 
11,3 
(4,06) 
-7,53E-03 
(-2,73) 
-3,87E-03 
(-4,11) 
3,10E-03 
(1,16) 
-2,29E-01 
(-8,08) 
-8,08E-03 
(-1,93) 
1,24E-03 
(6,44E-01) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
-12,1 
(-2,43) 
17,4 
(4,32) 
5,01E-03 
(1,27) 
1,28E-03 
(8,95E-01) 
3,24E-03 
(1,18) 
-1,20E-03 
(-4,94E-02) 
1,42E-02 
(1,64) 
2,03E-03 
(8,26) 
Impact of 2,1β  on different values, Case 1 
Table 11:
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 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
-1,84E+01 
(-3,70) 
4,77 
(2,5) 
-7,56E-03 
(-2,73) 
-2,11E-03 
(-2,03) 
-2,16E-03 
(-8,44E-01) 
-2,22E-01 
(-8,16) 
-6,93E-03 
(-1,58) 
-1,80E-03 
(-9,68E-01) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
-3,79E+01 
(-6,39) 
7,17E+01 
(32,9) 
2,99E-02 
(6,9) 
1,73E-02 
(11,7) 
-5,04E-04 
(-1,92E-01) 
1,69E-01 
(7,4) 
-1,44E-02 
(-3,16) 
-2,04E-03 
(-8,49E-01) 
Impact of 2,1β  on different values, Case 2 
Table 12:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
2,48E-08 
(8,28E-02) 
4,06E-06 
(2,31) 
9,64E-07 
(1,49) 
-1,56E-03 
(-8,58E-01) 
2,48E-08 
(8,28E-02) 
4,06E-06 
(2,31) 
9,64E-07 
(1,49) 
1,96E-03 
(2,14) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
7,62E-07 
(1,46) 
2,71E-07 
(1,06) 
1,12E-06 
(1,65) 
-4,30E-03 
(-1,64) 
2,35E-07 
(5,49E-01) 
4,30E-06 
(2,17) 
8,99E-07 
(1,41) 
3,75E-04 
(2,68E-01) 
Impact of 2,1η  on the emissions, Case 1 
Table 13:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
-5,3E-07 
(-1,7) 
1,6E-06 
(8,9E-01) 
-4,1E-07 
(-6,0E-01) 
2,1E-03 
(1,1) 
-5,3E-07 
(-1,7) 
1,6E-06 
(8,9E-01) 
-4,1E-07 
(-6E-01) 
2,3E-03 
(2,4) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
-5,5E-07 
(-1,2) 
2,0E-06 
(1) 
-4,5E-07 
(-6,7E-01) 
2,5E-03 
(1) 
-4,3E-07 
(-8E-01) 
-3,0E-08 
(-1,2E-01) 
-3,7E-07 
(-5,3E-01) 
1,6E-03 
(9,3E-01) 
Impact of 2,1η  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 14:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
1,10E-07 
(6,77E-01) 
-6,21E-07 
(-6,19E-01) 
-3,47E-05 
(-4,18E-01) 
1,91E-01 
(17) 
1,10E-07 
(6,77E-01) 
-6,21E-07 
(-6,19E-01) 
-3,47E-05 
(-4,2E-01) 
1,91E-01 
(17) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
-1,60E-07 
(-5,81E-01) 
6,44E-08 
(6,32E-02) 
-1,99E-05 
(-4,16E-01) 
-1,89E-01 
(-26,3) 
3,30E-07 
(1,18) 
-9,31E-07 
(-4,0E-01) 
-1,97E-05 
(-4E-01) 
4,10E-01 
(5,56E+01) 
Impact of 2,1η  on the investments, Case 1 
 
Table 15:
29
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
1,9E-07 
(1) 
4,2E-07 
(4,3E-01) 
-1,1E-04 
(-1,3) 
2,0E-01 
(17) 
1,9E-07 
(1) 
4,2E-07 
(4,3E-01) 
-1,1E-04 
(-1,3) 
2,0E-01 
(17) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
1,4E-07 
(5E-01) 
1,3E-07 
(5,6E-02) 
-6,3E-05 
(-1,3) 
-1,9E-01 
(-26) 
9,3E-08 
(3,3E-01) 
2,1E-07 
(2E-01) 
-6,3E-05 
(-1,3) 
4,2E-01 
(57) 
Impact of 2,1η  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 16:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
4,06E+01 
(5,70E-01) 
1,24E+03 
(30) 
2,32E-02 
(5,66E-01) 
1,02E-02 
(7,28E-01) 
1,58E-01 
(3,97) 
-8,05E-01 
(-1,91) 
-3,09E-03 
(-5E-02) 
2,46E-01 
(8,6) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
-2,70E+02 
(-3,65) 
1,26E+03 
(21,1) 
-6,74E-02 
(-1,15) 
-4,05E-02 
(-1,91) 
5,75E-01 
(1,42E+01) 
-4,44E-01 
(-1,23) 
1,04E-01 
(8E-01) 
4,34E-01 
(12) 
Impact of 2,1η  on different values, Case 1 
Table 17:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
Cooperative 
equilibrium 
2,2E+01 
(2,9E-01) 
1,3E+03 
(4,5E+01) 
3,0E-02 
(7,2E-01) 
1,1E-02 
(7E-01) 
2,3E-01 
(5,8) 
-5,0E-01 
(-1,2) 
6,5E-03 
(9,6E-02) 
2,9E-01 
(10) 
Markovian 
equilibrium 
7,3E+01 
(8E-01) 
1,4E+03 
(43) 
7,3E-02 
(1,1) 
3,1E-02 
(1,4) 
-6,1E-02 
(-1,5) 
-2,7E-01 
(-7,6E-01) 
1,7E-02 
(2,5E-01) 
2,7E-01 
(7,3) 
Impact of 2,1η  on different values, Case 2 
Table 18:
30
A.3 Impact of the growth in the rich country
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
1,09E-08 4,65E-08 2,61E-08 2,15E-03 1,09E-08 4,65E-08 2,61E-08 -6,15E-04 Cooperative 
equilibrium (9,09E-01) (6,61E-01) (1,01) (29,6) (9,09E-01) (6,61E-01) (1,01) (-168) 
2,17E-08 9,73E-11 2,62E-08 2,31E-03 1,14E-08 6,10E-08 2,64E-08 -2,94E-04 Markovian 
equilibrium (1,04) (9,55E-03) (9,64E-01) (22) (6,71E-01) (7,7E-01) (1,03) (-5,26) 
Impact of 1,1β  on the emissions, Case 1 
 
Table 19:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
-1,6E-09 1,0E-07 1,9E-08 2,2E-03 -1,6E-09 1,0E-07 1,9E-08 -5,7E-04 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-1,3E-01) (1,5) (7,3E-01) (29) (-1,3E-01) (1,5) (7,3E-01) (-14) 
5,1E-09 1,1E-07 1,8E-08 2,1E-03 1,3E-08 1,3E-08 2,3E-08 -6,1E-05 Markovian 
equilibrium (2,9E-01) (1,3) (6,9E-01) (23) (6,3E-01) (1,3) (8,1E-01) (-9E-01) 
Impact of 1,1β  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 20:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I  2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
-1,01E-08 -6,18E-08 2,3E-06 -4,94E-04 -1,01E-08 -6,18E-08 2,3E-06 -4,94E-04 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-1,56) (-1,54) (7E-01) (-1,1) (-1,56) (-1,54) (7E-01) (-1,1) 
-2,03E-08 6,91E-08 1,4E-06 -1,03E-03 1,22E-08 -1,54E-07 1,4E-06 4,60E-04 Markovian 
equilibrium (-1,84) (1,7) (7E-01) (-3,58) (1,1) (-1,66) (7E-01) (1,56) 
Impact of 1,1β  on the investments, Case 1 
Table 21:
31
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
3,8E-09 -4,2E-08 2,6E-06 -4,8E-05 3,8E-09 -4,2E-08 2,6E-06 -4,8E-05 Cooperative 
equilibrium (5,2E-01) (-1,1) (7,6E-01) (-1E-01) (5,2E-01) (-1,1) (7,6E-01) (-1E-01) 
1,0E-08 -8,7E-08 1,5E-06 -4,1E-04 -4,1E-09 3,0E-08 1,5E-06 3,9E-04 Markovian 
equilibrium (8,9E-01) (-9,4E-01) (7,6E-01) (-1,4) (-3,7E-01) (7,1E-01) (7,6E-01) (1,3) 
Impact of 1,1β  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 22:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
9,96E+01 -1,51E+01 3,08E-02 1,56E-02 -1,32E-03 8,38E-01 5,20E-02 -8,12E-05 Cooperative 
equilibrium (35) (-9,1) (19) (28) (-8,3E-01) (50) (21) (-7,1E-02) 
1,31E+02 -2,14E+01 3,70E-02 1,89E-02 -7,86E-04 8,77E-01 3,94E-02 -3,37E-04 Markovian 
equilibrium (44) (-8,9) (16) (22) (-4,9E-01) (61) (7,7) (-2,3E-01) 
Impact of 1,1β  on different values, Case 1 
Table 23:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
91 -1,8 3,5E-02 1,6E-02 8,8E-04 8,3E-01 4,8E-02 1,5E-03 Cooperative 
equilibrium (30) (-1,5) (21) (26) (5,7E-01) (50) (18) (1,3) 
90 -4,0 3,3E-02 1,5E-02 2,2E-03 6,4E-01 4,6E-02 3,3E-03 Markovian 
equilibrium (25) (-3,1) (13) (17) (1,4) (46) (17) (2,3) 
Impact of 1,1β  on different values, Case 2 
Table 24:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
-2,7E-07 5,4E-07 -6,5E-08 9,2E-04 -2,7E-07 5,4E-07 -6,5E-08 1,2E-03 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-9,2E-01) (3,1E-01) (-1,0E-01) (5,1E-01) (-9,2E-01) (3,1E-01) (-1,0E-01) (1,4) 
-2,4E-07 2,5E-07 -2,4E-08 8,8E-04 8,4E-08 -3,3E-08 -6,7E-08 -8,0E-04 Markovian 
equilibrium (-4,6E-01) (1) (-3,5E-02) (3,4E-01) (2,0E-01) (-1,7E-02) (-1,1E-01) (-5,8E-01) 
Impact of 1,1η  on the emissions, Case 1 
Table 25:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
3,1E-08 1,9E-06 6,8E-08 6,0E-04 3,1E-08 1,9E-06 6,8E-08 -3,9E-04 Cooperative 
equilibrium (1E-01) (1,1) (1E-01) (3,1E-01) (1E-01) (1,1) (1E-01) (-3,9E-01) 
-1,6E-07 2,3E-06 5,7E-08 9,6E-04 1,4E-07 2,0E-07 9,1E-08 -1,0E-03 Markovian 
equilibrium (-3,5E-01) (1,1) (8,5E-02) (4,2E-01) (2,6E-01) (8,1E-01) (1,3E-01) (-5,9E-01) 
Impact of 1,1η  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 26:
32
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I  2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
1,4E-07 1,3E-07 7,8E-05 2,1E-01 1,4E-07 1,3E-07 7,8E-05 2,1E-01 Cooperative 
equilibrium (8,5E-01) (1,4E-01) (9,5E-01) (19) (8,5E-01) (1,4E-01) (9,5E-01) (19) 
2,0E-07 -5,6E-07 4,5E-05 4,2E-01 -8,7E-08 8,1E-07 4,5E-05 -1,8E-01 Markovian 
equilibrium (7,5E-01) (-5,6E-01) (9,6E-01) (59) (-3,2E-01) (3,5E-01) (9,6E-01) (-25) 
Impact of 1,1η  on the investments, Case 1 
Table 27:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
1,9E-07 -2,6E-07 8,1E-06 2,0E-01 1,9E-07 -2,6E-07 8,1E-06 2,0E-01 Cooperative 
equilibrium (1) (-2,7E-01) (9,6E-02) (18) (1) (-2,7E-01) (9,6E-02) (18) 
2,4E-07 -9,8E-07 4,7E-06 4,2E-01 1,8E-08 4,6E-07 4,6E-06 -1,9E-01 Markovian 
equilibrium (8,5E-01) (-4,2E-01) (9,5E-02) (57) (6,5E-02) (4,4E-01) (9,4E-02) (-25) 
Impact of 1,1η  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 28:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
1,4E+03 -2,5 -1,5E-02 3,8E-03 2,2E-01 -1,2E-01 8,5E-02 2,9E-01 Cooperative 
equilibrium (19) (-6,0E-02) (-3,6E-01) (2,7E-01) (5,7) (-2,9E-01) (1,4) (10) 
1,5E+03 83 -9,7E-02 1,1E-02 -1,7E-01 7,8E-01 1,7E-01 1,1E-01 Markovian 
equilibrium (20) (1,4) (-1,7) (5,3E-01) (-4,2) (2,2) (1,3) (3,1) 
Impact of 1,1η  on different values, Case 1 
Table 29:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
1,3E+03 -3 1,8E-02 -4,1E-04 2,1E-01 5,5E-01 -9,7E-02 2,8E-01 Cooperative 
equilibrium (17) (-1,0E-01) (4,3E-01) (-2,6E-02) (5,5) (1,3) (-1,4) (10) 
1,3E+03 -1,0E+02 -2,9E-02 -1,6E-02 5,2E-01 2,1E-01 -1,6E-01 2,9E-01 Markovian 
equilibrium (14) (-3,1) (-4,4E-01) (-7E-01) (13) (6E-01) (-2,3) (7,8) 
Impact of 1,1η  on different values, Case 2 
Table 30:
33
A.4 Impact of environmental concerns in the rich coun-
try
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
1,5E-03 -6,6E-02 -1,2E-03 -4 1,5E-03 -6,6E-02 -1,2E-03 -7,3 Cooperative 
equilibrium (1,3) (-9,6) (-4,7E-01) (-5,6E-01) (1,3) (-9,6) (-4,7E-01) (-2) 
2,9E-03 -7,2E-02 -9,2E-04 -9,4 -3,0E-03 8,1E-03 -1,7E-03 9 Markovian 
equilibrium (1,4) (-72) (-3,4E-01) (-9,1E-01) (-1,8) (1) (-6,9E-01) (1,6) 
Impact of 1α  on the emissions, Case 1 
Table 31:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
3,0E-03 -6,1E-02 5,6E-04 -12 3E-03 -6,1E-02 5,6E-04 -1,1E+01 Cooperative 
equilibrium (24) (-87) (2,1) (-16) (24) (-87) (2,1) (-28) 
4,6E-03 -7,1E-02 8,9E-04 -19 -1,6E-05 6,9E-04 8,3E-05 7,3E-02 Markovian 
equilibrium (26) (-88) (3,3) (-20) (-7,5E-02) (7) (2,9E-01) (1,1E-01) 
Impact of 1α  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 32:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I  2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
-3,9E-04 2,2E-02 -3,1E-01 1,2 -3,9E-04 2,2E-02 -3,1E-01 1,2 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-6,2E-01) (5,7) (-9,5E-01) (2,7E-02) (-6,2E-01) (5,7) (-9,5E-01) (2,7E-02) 
-4,4E-03 6,1E-02 -1,8E-01 32 4,1E-03 -3,7E-02 -1,8E-01 -31 Markovian 
equilibrium (-4,1) (15) (-9,7E-01) (1,1) (3,8) (-4,1) (-9,6E-01) (-1,1) 
Impact of 1α  on the investments, Case 1 
Table 33:
34
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
-1,1E-03 2,2E-02 4,4E-02 4,7 -1,1E-03 2,2E-02 4,4E-02 4,7 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-15) (57) (1,3) (1) (-15) (57) (1,3) (1) 
-4,2E-03 5,7E-02 2,5E-02 16 2,3E-03 -2,7E-02 2,6E-02 -8,3 Markovian 
equilibrium (-36) (60) (1,3) (5,5) (20) (-63) (1,3) (-2,8) 
Impact of 1α  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 34:
A.5 Impact of environmental concerns in the poor coun-
try
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
-7,7E+06 2,2E+05 -990 -410 59 -8700 100 (13) Cooperative 
equilibrium (-28) (1,4) (-6,2) (-7,5) (3,8E-01) (-5,3) (4,2E-01) (1,1E-01) 
-7,2E+06 5,2E+05 -1300 -500 -100 -7800 1100 -1 Markovian 
equilibrium (-25) (2,2) (-5,6) (-6) (-6,6E-01) (-5,5) (2,2) (-7,3E-03) 
Impact of 1α  on different values, Case 1 
Table 35:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
-7,6E+06 -3,3E+04 -880 -430 30 -8900 -120 5,4 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-250) (-2,8) (-52) (-68) (1,9) (-53) (-4,5) (4,7E-01) 
-8,5E+06 8,4E+04 -990 -490 76 -6900 -71 5,2 Markovian 
equilibrium (-230) (63) (-37) (-54) (4,7) (-49) (-2,5) (3,5E-01) 
Impact of 1α  on different values, Case 2 
Table 36:
35
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
2,8E-03 -6,2E-02 2,7E-04 -11 2,8E-03 -6,2E-02 2,7E-04 -11 Cooperative 
equilibrium (24) (-88) (1) (-15) (24) (-88) (1) (-30) 
-3,0E-04 5,4E-04 -2,4E-04 1,6 4,5E-03 -7,1E-02 6,1E-04 -18 Markovian 
equilibrium (-1,4) (5,3) (-8,7E-01) (1,5) (26) (-90) (2,4) (-32) 
Impact of 2α  on the emissions, Case 1 
Table 37:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
3,6E-03 -5,7E-02 2,6E-03 -18 3,6E-03 -5,7E-02 2,6E-03 -12 Cooperative 
equilibrium (2,9) (-8,2) (1) (-2,4) (2,9) (-8,2) (1,0) (-3,2) 
-2,3E-04 1,5E-02 1,9E-03 -1,1 6,3E-03 -7,1E-02 3,2E-03 -24 Markovian 
equilibrium (-1,3E-01) (1,9) (7,4E-01) (-1,3E-01) (3) (-73) (1,1) (-3,5) 
Impact of 2α  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 38:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I  2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
-1,1E-03 2,2E-02 2,0E-02 9,4E-01 -1,1E-03 2,2E-02 2,0E-02 9,4E-01 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-17) (54) (6,1E-01) (2,1E-01) (-17) (54) (6,1E-01) (2,1E-01) 
2,3E-03 -2,6E-02 1,2E-02 -1,1E+01 -4,1E-03 5,5E-02 1,1E-02 1,4E+01 Markovian 
equilibrium (21) (-64) (6,3E-01) (-3,7) (-37) (6) (5,7E-01) (4,7) 
Impact of 2α  on the investments, Case 1 
Table 39:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
-1,8E-03 1,7E-02 -1,6E-01 -14 -1,8E-03 1,7E-02 -1,6E-01 -14 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-2,4) (4,3) (-4,9E-01) (-3,2E-01) (-2,4) (4,3) (-4,9E-01) (-3,2E-01) 
4,3E-03 -4,7E-02 -9,4E-02 -25 -6,1E-03 6,4E-02 -9,6E-02 7,3 Markovian 
equilibrium (3,8) (-5,1) (-4,9E-01) (-8,7E-01) (-5,5) (16) (-5,0E-01) (2,5E-01) 
Impact of 2α  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 40:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
-1,8E+06 -5,8E+06 -910 -420 6,8E-01 -8600 -99 -16 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-64) (-350) (-56) (-76) (4,3E-02) (-51) (-4) (-1,4) 
1,4E+04 -7,1E+06 -230 -88 66 490 -22 -19 Markovian 
equilibrium (4,9E-01) (-300) (-9,9) (-10) (4,1) (3,4) (-4,4E-01) (-1,3) 
Impact of 2α  on different values, Case 1 
Table 41:
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 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
-1,2E+06 -6,2E+06 -660 -430 -52 -8600 -420 -36 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-4,2) (-54) (-4) (-6,9) (-3,4E-01) (-5,3) (-1,6) (-3,3E-01) 
1,2E+06 -7,1E+06 -650 -470 -14 -2200 430 33 Markovian 
equilibrium (3,2) (-55) (-2,5) (-5,2) (-8,8E-02) (-1,6) (1,6) (2,3E-01) 
Impact of 2α  on different values, Case 2 
Table 42:
A.6 Impact of the rate of pollution decay
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
-2,0E-02 2,0E-01 -1,5E-03 77 -2,0E-02 2,0E-01 -1,5E-03 76 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-17) (29) (-5,9E-01) (11) (-17) (29) (-5,9E-01) (21) 
-1,7E-03 2,0E-02 -2,9E-04 4 -2,8E-02 2,3E-01 -2,4E-03 110 Markovian 
equilibrium (-8,1E-01) (20) (-1,1E-01) (3,9E-01) (-17) (29) (-9,7E-01) (20) 
Impact of δ  on the emissions, Case 1 
Table 43:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
-1,8E-02 2,0E-01 2,2E-03 65 -1,8E-02 2E-01 2,2E-03 73 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-15) (30) (8,5E-01) (8,5) (-15) (30) (8,5E-01) (19) 
-2,5E-02 2,3E-01 1,3E-03 94 1,4E-03 2,1E-02 3,6E-03 -2,8 Markovian 
equilibrium (-14) (29) (5,2E-01) (10) (6,7E-01) (22) (1,3) (-4,1E-01) 
Impact of δ  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 44:
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 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I  2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
6,5E-03 -7,8E-02 4,4E-01 -100 6,5E-03 -7,8E-02 4,4E-01 -100 Cooperative 
equilibrium (10) (-20) (1,3) (-2,3) (10) (-20) (1,3) (-2,3) 
-1,2E-02 8,0E-02 2,6E-01 12 2,3E-02 -1,9E-01 2,6E-01 -140 Markovian 
equilibrium (-11) (20) (1,3) (4,1E-01) (21) (-21) (1,4) (-4,9) 
Impact of δ  on the investments, Case 1 
Table 45:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
7,3E-03 -7,8E-02 2,5E-01 8,5 7,3E-03 -7,8E-02 2,5E-01 8,5 Cooperative 
equilibrium (10) (-20) (7,4E-01) (1,9E-01) (10) (-20) (7,4E-01) (1,9E-01) 
2,4E-02 -1,9E-01 1,5E-01 -51 -1,1E-02 7,7E-02 1,4E-01 44 Markovian 
equilibrium (21) (-21) (7,5E-01) (-1,8) (-10) (19) (7,4E-01) (1,5) 
Impact of δ  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 46:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
8,2E+06 4,4E+06 3600 -4500 -89 1,4E+05 -2,2E+04 -27 Cooperative 
equilibrium (29) (27) (23) (-81) (-5,7E-01) (81) (-89) (-2,4E-01) 
8,2E+05 7,1E+06 1200 -6000 -390 1,7E+04 -2,9E+04 -250 Markovian 
equilibrium (2,8) (30) (5,2) (-72) (-2,4) (12) (-57) (-1,8) 
Impact of δ  on different values, Case 1 
Table 47:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
1,2E+07 7,7E+05 3500 -4500 -81 1,3E+05 -2,2E+04 17 Cooperative 
equilibrium (40) (6,7) (21) (-73) (-5,2E-01) (82) (-84) (1,6E-01) 
1,3E+07 3,6E+05 3900 -4500 -200 1,1E+05 -2,2E+04 8,6 Markovian 
equilibrium (37) (2,7) (15) (-51) (-1,2) (78) (-79) (6,0E-02) 
Impact of δ  on different values, Case 2 
Table 48:
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A.7 Impact of the social discount rate
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
-2,1E-02 9,5E-02 -2,9E-04 79 -2,1E-02 9,5E-02 -2,9E-04 81 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-52) (41) (-3,4E-01) (33) (-52) (41) (-3,4E-01) (67) 
-6,6E-03 1,2E-02 3,2E-04 33 -1,7E-02 1,0E-01 -7,7E-04 58 Markovian 
equilibrium (-9,6) (35) (3,6E-01) (9,5) (-31) (39) (-9,1E-01) (32) 
Impact of ρ  on the emissions, Case 1 
Table 49:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
-2,0E-02 9,7E-02 1,5E-03 78 -2E-02 9,7E-02 1,5E-03 81 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-49) (42) (1,6) (30) (-49) (42) (1,6) (62) 
-1,6E-02 1E-01 1,0E-03 72 -5,5E-03 1,2E-02 2,0E-03 15 Markovian 
equilibrium (-28) (38) (1,2) (24) (-7,9) (38) (2,2) (6,6) 
Impact of ρ  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 50:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I  2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
7,4E-03 -3,4E-02 1,5E-01 -49 7,4E-03 -3,4E-02 1,5E-01 -49 Cooperative 
equilibrium (35) (-26) (1,4) (-3,3) (35) (-26) (1,4) (-3,3) 
-2,5E-03 3,3E-02 1,1E-01 -9,5 1,2E-02 -8,1E-02 1,1E-01 -58 Markovian 
equilibrium (-6,9) (25) (1,7) (-1) (34) (-26) (1,8) (-5,9) 
Impact of ρ  on the investments, Case 1 
Table 51:
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 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
7,3E-03 -3,6E-02 2,7E-01 -63 7,3E-03 -3,6E-02 2,7E-01 -63 Cooperative 
equilibrium (30) (-28) (2,4) (-4,1) (30) (-28) (2,4) (-4,1) 
1,3E-02 -8,5E-02 1,8E-01 -79 -2,8E-03 3,6E-02 1,8E-01 -5,5 Markovian 
equilibrium (34) (-28) (2,7) (-8,1) (-7,6) (26) (2,7) (-5,7E-01) 
Impact of ρ  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 52:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
5,4E+06 -3E+06 2200 1000 -7,6 2,2E+04 -33 24 Cooperative 
equilibrium (58) (-55) (41) (57) (-1,5E-01) (39) (-4,1E-01) (6,4E-01) 
2,3E+06 -3,2E+06 1000 470 -160 4500 -6E+02 -3,7E+01 Markovian 
equilibrium (23) (-41) (13) (17) (-2,9) (9,4) (-3,5) (-7,8E-01) 
Impact of ρ  on different values, Case 1 
Table 53:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
2E+06 4,3E+05 2200 1100 -22 2,1E+04 -36 15 Cooperative 
equilibrium (20) (11) (40) (50) (-4,2E-01) (39) (-4,1E-01) (4E-01) 
8E+05 8E+05 2300 1100 -140 1,6E+04 100 4,6 Markovian 
equilibrium (6,7) (18) (27) (37) (-2,6) (34) (1,1) (9,4E-02) 
Impact of ρ  on different values, Case 2 
Table 54:
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A.8 Impact of the investment cost
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E 2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E  
-5,8E-08 -5,2E-05 -1,0E-06 2,6E-02 -5,8E-08 -5,2E-05 -1,0E-06 -2,8E-02 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-9,8E-03) (-1,5) (-8,0E-02) (7,3E-01) (-9,8E-03) (-1,5) (-8,0E-02) (-1,5) 
-8,8E-06 -8,3E-06 -1,6E-05 5,5E-02 -4,4E-06 -5,2E-05 3,2E-06 1,3E-03 Markovian 
equilibrium (-8,6E-01) (-1,6) (-1,2) (1,1) (-5,3E-01) (-1,3) (2,5E-01) (4,6E-02) 
Impact of γ  on the emissions, Case 1 
Table 55:
 1dE
dP
 1dE
dM
 1dE
dX
 1( )cte E
 
2dE
dP
 2dE
dM
 2dE
dX
 2( )cte E
 
-1,8E-06 5,4E-05 1,7E-05 -1,3E-02 -1,8E-06 5,4E-05 1,7E-05 2,6E-02 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-2,9E-01) (1,6) (1,3) (-3,4E-01) (-2,9E-01) (1,6) (1,3) (1,3) 
-5,2E-06 6,7E-05 2,1E-05 2,7E-03 4,8E-06 1,2E-06 4,1E-06 -1,6E-03 Markovian 
equilibrium (-5,9E-01) (1,7) (1,6) (6,0E-02) (4,5E-01) (2,4E-01) (3,0E-01) (-4,6E-02) 
Impact of γ  on the emissions, Case 2 
Table 56:
 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I  2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
-1,6E-04 -8,0E-04 1,9E-01 -20 -1,6E-04 -8,0E-04 1,9E-01 -20 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-51) (-41) (120) (-88) (-51) (-41) (120) (-88) 
-1,8E-04 7,0E-04 1,1E-01 -11 4,5E-07 -1,7E-03 1,1E-01 -12 Markovian 
equilibrium (-33) (35) (120) (-76) (8,3E-02) (-37) (120) (-82) 
Impact of γ  on the investments, Case 1 
Table 57:
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 1dI
dP
 1dI
dM
 1dI
dX
 1( )cte I 2dI
dP
 2dI
dM
 2dI
dX
 2( )cte I  
-1,7E-04 -8,6E-04 1,9E-01 -20 -1,7E-04 -8,6E-04 1,9E-01 -20 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-46) (-44) (120) (-87) (-46) (-44) (120) (-87) 
1,3E-05 -1,8E-03 1,1E-01 -12 -1,9E-04 7,6E-04 1,1E-01 -11 Markovian 
equilibrium (2,3) (-39) (120) (-79) (-34) (36) (120) (-78) 
Impact of γ  on the investments, Case 2 
Table 58:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M  (600)X  
-810 -76 5,7E-01 -2,7E-02 -7,0E-01 -1,7 -3,8E-01 -3,9E-01 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-5,8E-01) (-9,4E-02) (7,1E-01) (-9,7E-02) (-9,0E-01) (-2,1E-01) (-3,1E-01) (-7,0E-01) 
1500 110 1,9 5,6E-01 -2,1 -7,1 1,4E-01 -7,8E-01 Markovian 
equilibrium (1) (9,2E-02) (1,7) (1,3) (-2,6) (-9,9E-01) (5,7E-02) (-1,1) 
Impact of γ  on different values, Case 1 
Table 59:
 1(10)W  2 (10)W  (10)P  (10)M  (10)X  (600)P  (600)M
 
(600)X  
-390 1000 -4,4E-01 1,6E-01 1 5,1 1 6,7E-01 Cooperative 
equilibrium (-2,6E-01) (1,8) (-5,2E-01) (5E-01) (1,3) (6,2E-01) (7,7E-01) (1,2) 
520 1300 -5,1E-01 2,8E-01 -5,8E-01 1,9 4,2E-01 1,5E-01 Markovian 
equilibrium (2,9E-01) (2) (-3,9E-01) (6,2E-01) (-7,3E-01) (2,7E-01) (3,1E-01) (2,0E-01) 
Impact of γ  on different values, Case 2 
Table 60:
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B Algorithm for the system of coupled alge-
braic Riccati equations
The algorithm used to compute the solutions of system 4 is taken from Freil-
ing et al. (1996).
1. We compute Km1 (0) and K
m
2 (0) the stabilizing symmetric solutions of
the following autonomous algebraic Riccati equations:
A′Km1 +K
m
1 A+Q1 −Km1 Sm1 Km1 = 0
A′Km2 +K
m
2 A+Q2 −Km2 Sm2 Km2 = 0
2. We compute the following discrete dynamical system, by taking Km1 (0)
and Km2 (0) as initial conditions:
Km1 (i+ 1) [A− Sm2 Km2 (i)] + [A− Sm2 Km2 (i)]′Km1 (i+ 1) +Q1
−Km1 (i+ 1)Sm1 Km1 (i+ 1) = 0
Km2 (i+ 1) [A− Sm1 Km1 (i)] + [A− Sm1 Km1 (i)]′Km2 (i+ 1) +Q2
−Km2 (i+ 1)Sm2 Km2 (i+ 1) = 0
Where i is the number of iterations
3. We stop after i∗, where i∗ is such as:∣∣Km1 (i∗) [A− Sm2 Km2 (i∗)] + [A− Sm2 Km2 (i∗)]′Km1 (i∗) +Q1 −Km1 (i∗)Sm1 Km1 (i∗)∣∣
+
∣∣Km2 (i∗) [A− Sm1 Km1 (i∗)] + [A− Sm1 Km1 (i∗)]′Km2 (i∗) +Q2 −Km2 (i∗)Sm2 Km2 (i∗)∣∣ < ε
Where ε is a small number, set equal to 10−8 in the current simulations.
4. Km1 (i
∗) and Km2 (i
∗) are the solutions of system 4.
Notice that there exist no proof of convergence for this algorithm. How-
ever, in the simulations made for this paper, it always converged.
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